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Abstract: 
Prior studies find dishonest top executives are associated with lower quality financial reporting. 
We focus on the role of rank-and-file employees in shaping financial data quality in that these 
employees are the sources of internal information transfer. Using a novel dataset that contains 
information on registrants using the Ashley Madison website to find extra-marital affair partners, 
we construct a firm-level employee integrity measure and assess the association between 
employee integrity and firm’s information quality. We find that low integrity of rank-and-file 
employees is associated with lower earnings quality and less accurate management forecasts, 
and we mitigate the potential endogeneity problem by estimating 2SLS regressions with 
instrument variables exogenous to firms’ information quality choices. Further analyses show that 
the negative relation between employee integrity and information quality is attenuated by higher 
managerial ability, and is robust to alternative employee integrity measures.  
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Introduction 
“In looking for people to hire, look for three qualities: integrity, intelligence, and energy.  
And if they don’t have the first one, the other two will kill you.” 
– Warren Buffet 
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Low integrity rank-and-file employee (hereafter “employees”) can be detrimental to firms, and 
the Wells Fargo scandal uncovered in September 2016 is a case in point. Wells Fargo employees 
created some 2 million fake accounts between 2011 and 2015, leading a massive firing of 5,300 
employees (CNN September 9, 2016). The impact of dishonest employees can exceed that of a 
rogue CEO because of the broad base of fraud and the number of people involved. However, 
existing evidence on the relation between employee integrity and firm behavior is sparse, possibly 
because lower level employees are anonymous and therefore hard to obtain data on.  
The recent release of the hacked data on registrants of the Ashley Madison (AM) website provides 
researchers with an opportunity to investigate the relation between employee integrity and firm 
behaviors. Our research is based on this hacked data and is conducted on the firm-level without 
intention to intrude individual privacy1. AM is a website that matches married people for 
extramarital dating and affairs. Registration on the AM website indicates a person’s intention to 
cheat in his/her marital life. By merging the registrants’ email domain with the Russell 3000 
companies’ email domains, we generate a measure of employee integrity by using the registrant 
counts in each company. That is, the greater the number of a firm’s employees registering with 
the website and actively using its service, the lower the degree of the firm’s employee integrity. 
Our study focuses on one important organization dimension: the financial information generation 
process, and two outcomes of such process are examined, namely, financial reporting quality and 
management earnings forecast accuracy. Mandatory or voluntary, financial reporting is an 
outcome of a firm’s economic activities and the firm’s information generating process. Employees 
have access to private information when discharging their delegated duties and thus feed 
information to this system (Galbraith 1974). With such information asymmetry, top executives 
rely on lower-level employees for information inputs with accuracy and fairness. However, 
individuals lacking integrity may distort information to meet their interests, or to cover up their 
own mistakes. As the other side of the same token, employees with high ethical level can serve as 
the first line of defense against fraudulent financial reporting by refusing to carry out the top 
executive’s unethical requests, as shown in an experimental study (Jollineau et al. 2012). Another 
channel that employee integrity can affect financial information quality is through corporate 
culture. If the number of dishonest agents increases, adverse selection among agents may drive 
out honest agents thus impair information production. 
                                                                   
1
 AM’s database was hacked in July 2015 and the data were released on the dark internet in August 2015. 
We obtained these data and matched firms’ email address domain with the registrants’ email address 
domain to identify the registrants’ employer. Before merging individual records with corporate email 
domains, we purposefully delete all personal information (i.e., the email account before the “@”) from our 
database so that we do not know which individual is making transactions with the AM website. 
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Our empirical analyses are based on the AM transaction data during years 2002–2014, and the 
financial and management forecast data of the Russel 3000 firms. After controlling for firm and 
industry characteristics as well as various fixed effects, our firm-level tests confirm that low 
employee integrity (i.e., greater AM users count) negatively affects financial reporting quality, as 
reflected in larger amount of unsigned discretionary accruals and weaker cashflow-accrual 
association (Kothari et al, 2005, Dechow and Dichev, 2002 and McNichols 2002). Lower 
employee integrity is also associated with less accurate management forecasts. In cross sectional 
tests, we find that capabilities of CEOs attenuate the negative relation between employee integrity 
and the firm’s information quality, indicating CEOs with sound judgments partly correct 
distortions generated at the employee level.  
 
Empirical Design 
To examine the effect of employee integrity on firms’ accrual quality, we estimate the following 
regression suggested in prior research (Kim et al. 2012): 
	
, =  + 	, + , +  , + !"#	"$%&',()* +
+,-, + .,/04, + 23456-, + 7/36-, + 8, + 9:&<, + 6=, +
"/>", + 4, + ∑ @AB"CC	 + D, 																								(1) 
To examine the effect of employee integrity on management forecast accuracy, we estimate the 
regressions as follows: 
A_::, =  + , + 6:, + </6F + 3456-, + !:3=4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+,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, + 74=66, + 83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,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,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,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,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,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CC	 + D,                               (2) 
Definitions of all variables in our tests are available in the Appendix to this paper. 
 
Results and Conclusion 
 
Table 1 describes our sample, as follows. 
 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Q1 Q3 
Dependent variables:      
ABSDA 0.102  0.045 0.199 0.019 0.097 
DD 0.102  0.038 0.226 0.015 0.088 
MEF_ERR 0.017 0.005 0.041   0.002   0.013 
      
Variable of Interests:      
AM Users 0.380  0.000 0.779 0.000 0.693 
Active AM Usage 0.171  0.000 0.456 0.000 0.000 
AM Users_CBSA 0.021 0.013 0.021 0.002 0.039 
 
Control Variables (accrual quality tests) 
Market Value 5.963  6.135 2.364 4.293 7.633 
LogEmp 6.973  7.138 2.442 5.181 8.779 
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BTM 0.467  0.412 0.716 0.205 0.695 
Adjusted ROA 2.257  0.931 4.493 0.240 2.575 
BIG4 0.694  1.000 0.460 0.000 1.000 
ANALYST 0.962  0.000 1.183 0.000 2.079 
INST 0.317  0.069 0.375 0.000 0.681 
AGE 2.875  2.890 0.724 2.302 3.433 
R&D 0.437 0.003 2.196 0.000 0.087 
SEO 0.196 0.000 0.472 0.000 0.000 
AdInd 0.040 0.014 0.094 0.005 0.033 
LEV 0.457 0.139 1.580 0.000 0.619 
 
Control Variables (management forecast accuracy test) 
SUR 0.016 0.009 0.018 0.001 0.025 
DISP 0.386 0.373 0.402 0.031 0.688 
ANALYST 12.890 11.000 8.762 6.000 18.000 
EARNVOL 0.321 0.192 0.380 0.110 0.366 
MV 7.758 7.674 1.625 6.606 8.867 
MB 3.141 2.444 2.751 1.632 3.760 
LOSS 0.107 0.000 0.309 0.000 0.000 
NEWS 0.534 1.000 0.498 0.000 1.000 
R&D  0.005 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.006 
HORIZON 141.717 77.000 103.573 62.000 242.000 
ANNUAL 0.585 1.000 0.492 0.000 1.000 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of dependent variables, variables of interests, and 
control variables used in the earnings quality as well as management forecast accuracy tests. All 
variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. The mean, median, standard deviation, 25 
percentile and 75 percentile of the sample are reported. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables  
 
Table 2 report our multiple regression results. Panel A of Table 2 presents the results from OLS 
estimation of Equation (1), where the dependent variable is the unsigned discretionary accruals 
(ABSDA). In estimation of all three specifications, coefficients on AM users are positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. In terms of economic significance, one standard deviation 
increase of AM users corresponds to a 7.3% (i.e., 0.010*0.779/0.102) decrease in the accrual 
quality. These results convey a consistent message: lower employee integrity (i.e., greater number 
of AM users in a firm) is associated with weaker accrual quality (i.e., higher level absolute value of 
discretionary accruals). Panel B show that lower employee integrity (i.e., greater number of AM 
users in a firm) is associated with lower level of accrual quality，in all three specifications, 
coefficients on AM Users are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 ABSDA ABSDA ABSDA 
 (1) (2) (3) 
AM users 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (4.61) (5.02) (4.24) 
MV -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.001 
 (-5.06) (-2.73) (-0.55) 
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LogEmp -0.015*** -0.019*** -0.022*** 
 (-11.65) (-11.73) (-10.51) 
BM -0.045*** -0.042*** -0.042*** 
 (-12.77) (-11.83) (-9.09) 
ROA 0.001 -0.001*** -0.001** 
 (1.55) (-2.91) (-2.19) 
BIG4 -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.030*** 
 (-9.30) (-9.80) (-6.72) 
ANALYST -0.002 0.001 0.000 
 (1.50) (0.60) (0.25) 
INST -0.003 -0.005 -0.011 
 (-0.76) (-1.01) (-1.90)* 
AGE -0.016*** -0.011*** -0.003 
 (-6.38) (-4.44) (-1.07) 
R&D 0.004** 0.004** 0.003 
 (2.54) (2.32) (1.64) 
SEO 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.015*** 
 (5.89) (6.90) (4.77) 
AdInd 0.083*** 0.031** 0.013 
 (5.52) (2.01) (0.77) 
LEV -0.001 0.000 0.001** 
 (-1.17) (0.16) (2.03) 
Year   Yes Yes 
SIC2   Yes Yes 
CBSA   Yes 
Constant 0.320*** 0.306*** 0.282*** 
 (30.07) (14.70) (6.94) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.15 0.19 0.21 
Number of Observations 29,780 29,780 29,780 
Panel A. Unsigned discretionary accrual as proxy for accrual quality 
 
 DD DD DD 
 (1) (2) (3) 
AM users 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 
 (3.35) (4.57) (3.95) 
MV -0.016*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (-10.46) (-5.18) (-3.97) 
LogEmp -0.003** -0.013*** -0.016*** 
 (-1.97) (-7.92) (-6.94) 
BM -0.050*** -0.046*** -0.048*** 
 (-11.47) (-10.39) (-8.12) 
ROA -0.000 -0.002*** -0.001** 
 (-0.59) (-4.05) (-2.53) 
BIG4 -0.034*** -0.030*** -0.024*** 
 (-7.16) (-7.10) (-4.76) 
ANALYST -0.003 0.002 0.008*** 
 (-1.35) (1.15) (3.32) 
INST -0.018*** -0.009 -0.014** 
 (-3.19) (-1.50) (-2.13) 
AGE -0.006 -0.002 -0.000 
 (-1.94) (-0.72) (-0.03) 
R&D 0.005*** 0.004** 0.004* 
 (2.79) (2.37) (1.81) 
SEO 0.010*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 
 (3.04) (4.79) (3.28) 
AdInd 0.001 -0.010 -0.014 
 (0.05) (-0.62) (-0.80) 
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LEV 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.61) (0.96) (1.32) 
Year   Yes Yes 
SIC2   Yes Yes 
CBSA   Yes 
 0.279*** 0.275*** 0.35*** 
Constant (24.49) (9.75) (4.13) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.09 0.16 0.18 
Number of Observations 27,495 27,495 27,495 
Panel B. DD-model accrual quality as proxy for accrual quality 
This table presents the results from estimating OLS regressions that test the relation between 
accrual quality and employee integrity proxied by the use of the AM website. In Panel A, the 
dependent variables are the unsigned discretionary accrual, ABSDA, which is the absolute value 
of discretionary accruals from performance adjusted modified Jones model; in Panel B, the 
dependent variable is DD, which is the absolute value of the error terms from the cross-sectional 
regressions that fit a firm’s current period accruals on its lagged, present and led cash flows from 
operation (McNicoles, 2002),. The higher the value of ABSDA or DD implies lower quality 
accruals. The independent variable of interest is AM users, which is the number of registered AM 
users in a firm in year t. Greater number of AM Users implies lower level of employee integrity. 
We estimate the regression with standard errors clustered at the firm level; t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses underneath each coefficient. *, **, *** refers to statistically significance 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Table 2. Employee Integrity and Accrual Quality: Firm-level evidence 
 
Table 3 reports estimations of OLS regression of Equation (4). The dependent variable is 
management earnings forecast error (MEF_ERR). Coefficients on AM Users are all positive; the 
coefficient is significant at the 1% level when no fixed effects are added, at 5% level if year and 
industry fixed effects are added, and at the 10% level if year, industry and region fixed effects are 
added. Results from all three specifications are consistent with our hypotheses that lower level of 
employee integrity (i.e., greater number of AM users in a firm) is associated with less accurate 
management forecast (i.e., greater management forecast errors). 
 
 Mgmt. forecast 
error 
Mgmt. forecast 
error 
Mgmt. forecast 
error 
AM Users 0.002*** 0.002** 0.001* 
 (3.72) (2.10) (1.75) 
SUR 0.117*** 0.091*** 0.101*** 
 (3.58) (3.24) (3.51) 
DISP -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (-3.10) (-2.87) (-3.04) 
LANALYST 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (2.16) (2.62) (3.06) 
EARNVOL 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 
 (7.96) (7.51) (6.09) 
MV -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.007*** 
 (-8.58) (-7.95) (-8.09) 
LogEmp 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (4.16) (5.11) (5.26) 
MB -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
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 (-7.32) (-5.22) (-4.43) 
LOSS 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 
 (11.57) (11.30) (10.33) 
NEWS -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-3.77) (-3.21) (-2.63) 
RD 0.355*** 0.425*** 0.456*** 
 (5.60) (6.12) (6.26) 
HORIZON 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (12.53) (12.42) (11.95) 
ANNUAL 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 
 (14.03) (13.83) (13.07) 
Year   Yes Yes 
SIC2   Yes Yes 
CBSA   Yes 
 0.023***     0.014***     0.022*** 
Constant (7.73) (3.12) (7.50) 
 0.15 0.17 0.18 
Adjusted R-squared       39,800       39,800       39,800 
 
This table presents the results from estimating OLS regressions that test the relation between 
management earnings forecast accuracy and employee integrity proxied by the use of the AM 
website. Management earnings forecast error is defined as | forecast – actual | / closing price of 
the corresponding fiscal period; the higher the value implies lower level of forecast accuracy. The 
independent variable of interest is AM users, which is the number of registered AM users in a 
firm in year t. Greater number of AM Users implies lower level of employee integrity. We 
estimate the regression with standard errors clustered at firm level; t-statistics are included in 
parentheses underneath each coefficient. *, **, *** refers to statistically significance levels of 10%, 
5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Table 3. Employee integrity and Management Forecast Accuracy: Forecast-level 
Evidence 
 
 
In the robustness tests, we use 2-stage-least-squares regressions with instrumental variable (IV) 
to establish causality between firms’ information quality and employee integrity. We choose two 
IVs, namely, a state’s divorce law, and CBSA level AM user counts, that will affect individual’s 
infidelity choices, but will not affect firms’ information quality. Untabulated results find 
robustness support for our hypothesis.  
The conclusion remarks of our study are as follows. Existing studies find that top management 
personal traits and integrity have significant impact on corporate strategic choices (Bamber et al. 
2010; Bertrand and Schoar 2003). Another strand of literature finds culture as a general feature 
of a region also affects firm behaviors (Garrett et al. 2014; Hilary and Hui 2009). We extend these 
studies by examining whether, and if so, how, employee integrity affects a firm’s internal 
information quality and thus the outputs of information, as reflected in earnings quality and 
management forecast accuracy. We find robust and confirming evidence supporting our 
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hypotheses that lower level of employee integrity compromises a firm’s information products. We 
use the AM registration and usage data to assess a firm’s employee integrity level. 
A test of this kind is always a joint test of the validity of the integrity measure and that of the 
relation between integrity and information quality. One caveat of using the AM data is the 
omission of individuals who use the AM website but do not register using the company’s email 
accounts. Such omission understates the proportion of employees with lower level integrities and 
thus reduces the power of our tests. However, we believe the number of AM users of a firm, 
although underrepresented, is a good measure of employee integrity, and will bias against finding 
statistically significant results. Another issue of our tests is the omitted correlated variable. 
Unobserved company characteristics may cause the cluster of unethical employees and lower 
information quality at the same time. We explicitly address this issue using the 2SLS with IVs. 
Our study complements the existing literature by showing the importance of rank-and-file 
employee ethics in shaping a firm’s information environment. Our results point out an important 
fact that may concern the practitioners and the regulator, that the concept of efficient internal 
control shall be broadened to include restraining the dysfunctional employee incentives and 
enhance efficiency in corporate information generation. 
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Appendix A. 
Variable Definition 
Variables Definition 
 
Variables of 
Interest 
 
AM Users AM users, which is logarithm of the number of employees using AM 
websites for firm i in year t.  
Active AM Usage Active AM usage, which is logarithm of the number of employees 
actively using AM accounts for firm i in year t.  
 
Variables in Accrual Quality Test  
ABSDA 
 
 
Absolute value of discretionary accruals, which is measured by the 
residual of the modified Jones model adjusting for the firm’s 
performance (Kothari et al. 2005). 
DD The DD-model (Dechow and Dichev, 2002) accrual quality, which is 
calculated as the absolute value of the error terms from the 
cross-sectional regression matching current period accruals with 
lagged, present and led values of cash flow from operation. The 
higher the value signifies lower accrual quality. 
MV Market value, measured as natural logarithm of the market value of 
equity. 
BM Book-to-market ratio, calculated using the book value of equity 
scaled by market value of equity. 
Adjusted ROA Industry-mean-adjusted ROA, where ROA is measured as income 
before extraordinary items scaled by lagged total assets. 
BIG4  Big-four auditor dummy, which equals to 1 if the firm hires one of 
the Big-four public accounting firms as its auditor, and 0 otherwise. 
ANALYST  Analyst following, measured as the natural logarithm of number of 
the firm’s analyst following plus one. 
LogEmp Logarithm of number of the firm’s employees. 
INST Institutional ownership; which is the percentage of outstanding 
shares owned by institutional investors. 
AGE Age of the firm; measured as natural logarithm of number of years 
between the current fiscal year and the year that the firm is listed. 
R&D  R&D intensity, measured as R&D expense scaled by net sales. 
SEO Equity offering dummy; which is an indicator variable that takes on 
a value of 1 if the firm has equity offerings in the following year, and 
0 otherwise. 
AdInd  Advertising intensity of the industry that a firm belongs to; an 
industry is defined by all firms sharing the same 2-digit SIC code.  
LEV Leverage, calculated as long-term debt scaled by total assets. 
 
Variables in Management Forecast Test 
MEF_ERR Management earnings forecast error。 
SUR Absolute value of the difference between management earnings 
forecasts and the median analyst earnings forecasts, scaled by the 
stock price at the beginning of the fiscal period. 
DISP Analyst forecast dispersion; measured as standard deviation of 
analysts’ forecasts divided by the absolute value of the median 
analyst forecast for the fiscal period. 
ANALYST Analyst following, measured as the number of analysts who issue 
earnings forecasts for firm i during the fiscal year t. 
 
